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Abstract
One can point out several reasons why the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have not been able to 
implement its mandate for more than 40 years. One of them would be the existence of an Islamic militant and terrorist 
group, Hezbollah. In fact, Hezbollah has filled the political vacuum since Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon 
in 2005. Currently, Hezbollah has gained popularity amongst Shiite Muslims, contributing to security, social and 
economic development. Hezbollah is now also politically recognized, making a coalition party. However, its status as 
a terrorist group has been consistent, threatening the international security. As far as Hezbollah is deployed in South 
Lebanon, Israel would continue challenging Hezbollah’s military intimidation and threat, which might result in another 
major warfare between them. In fact, one can identify several international agreements and UN resolutions on the 
disarmament of Hezbollah, although they have not been effective nor promising. In South Lebanon, Hezbollah took 
advantage of the cozy relations and even conspired with the local villagers, who helped conceal Hezbollah’s sizeable 
and sophisticated military equipment and prevented UNFIL from entering their personal properties. Such behaviors 
obviously decline the operational effectiveness of UNIFIL and increase the risk of the next warfare with Israel. 
Therefore, one can suggest multiple solutions to tackle this issue.
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1.  Introduction
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been deployed in South Lebanon in accordance 
with UN Security Council Resolution 425 since 1978. UNIFIL has been stationed in Lebanon for more than 40 
years despite the name of “the Interim Force”. While UNIFIL has been positively evaluated as a peacekeeping 
operation with the function of inducement, UNIFIL has been considered to be ineffective, not having the 
warfare between Israel and the Lebanese militants nor protecting local civilians. One of the biggest reasons 
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why UNFIL cannot be the interim force is the existence of Hezbollah. When Israel unilaterally withdrew 
from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah fi lled the resulting power vacuum. The problem is that Hezbollah is not the 
offi cial state military of Lebanon but a Shiite Islamist militant group which has the infamous history of terrorist 
crimes targeting the Israeli and Western people and organizations abroad. The Hezbollah militants have stayed 
between the Litani River and the Blue Line, the area of UNIFIL deployment in South Lebanon.
This paper will deal with Hezbollah with reference to UNIFIL. The first part of this paper will focus on 
the introductory description on Hezbollah. Despite the history as a terrorist group, Hezbollah has gained 
“grassroot” popularity and currently consistent political status in the parliament and government. The second 
part will argue the issue of the disarmament of Hezbollah. In fact, there are the multiple legal frameworks 
demanding the disarmament of Hezbollah. Nevertheless, the international community have not succeeded in 
the disarmament of Hezbollah. This has infl uenced the operational effectiveness of the peacekeeping tasks in 
UNIFIL. The third part of this article will therefore refer to the relations of UNIFIL staff with Hezbollah and the 
local villagers in South Lebanon. This article will describe how vulnerable UNIFIL soldiers have been in their 
relations with the local people who take sides in Hezbollah. 
In the conclusion, this paper will suggest several solutions to the issue of the deployment of Hezbollah and the 
inevitably “not interim” mission of UNIFIL. The solutions suggested here are multiple, focusing on 1) building 
the capability of Lebanese national army; 2)  maintenance of robust UNIFIL capabilities; 3) more positive 
assistance to local people by the international community; and 4) developing the Middle East peace process, 
especially the diplomatic relations between Israel and Lebanon.
2.  Hezbollah in Lebanon
Hezbollah, a revolutionary resistance group sponsored by Iran1, was formed in 1982 in Lebanon. The formation 
of Hezbollah represented the realization of Iranian campaign to spread the message of the Islamic revolution. It 
opposes Israel and Western powers operating in the Middle East. Hezbollah has been designated as a terrorist 
group by many countries including the US.2 In 1985, Hezbollah released its first manifesto which vowed to 
expel Western infl uence from Lebanon, calling for the destruction of the state of Israel and pledging allegiance 
to Iran. Militarily, Hezbollah is called “the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor”.3 Hezbollah launched 
several terrorist attacks to the Israeli-related buildings abroad.4 In fact, some terrorist attacks by Hezbollah 
were so successful that Israel did not even know how it happened and for years insisted on saying that the 
explosion was caused by a “gas leakage”.5 It is estimated that Hezbollah has tens of thousands of members and 
its supporters worldwide. Hezbollah sent more than seven thousand fi ghters to the Syrian Civil War in 2013, 
joining Iranian and Russian soldiers supporting the Assad regime in the Syrian Government.
Hezbollah currently has its status not only as a military but also as a political organization in Lebanon. 
Hezbollah fi rst entered Lebanon’s parliament in 1992 when it won eight of 128 seats in the state’s fi rst elections 
since 1972. In February 2006, Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) formed a political alliance, 
adding FPM’s parliamentary seats.
There are two political coalitions in Lebanon. The fi rst coalition is represented mainly by Sunnis, Druze and 
The Role of Hezbollah in South Lebanon
─ 19─
Christians that united following the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005. This is the so-called “March 14” 
group, named after the protest for the assassination on 14 March of the year. This group won the parliamentary 
elections of May 2005 by capturing 72 of 128 seats. The second coalition is mainly from the southern Lebanese 
Shia community, including Hezbollah and Amal in addition to the Christian community. This group is called the 
“March 8” group.6 In 2008, Hezbollah and its allies got 11 out of 30 cabinet seats. The following year, Hezbollah 
won 10 seats in the parliament, and The March 8 Movement got 58 seats, while the ruling March 14 Movement 
71 seats.7 At the national elections in 2018, Hezbollah got 13 seats in the state’s 128-member Parliament, while 
the Amal Movement which used to be its rival but now its coalition partner got 10 seats. Thus, Hezbollah 
increasingly exerted its political power. In particular, in UNIFIL’s area of operation, Hezbollah and its allies win 
more than 70 percent of votes.
It is to be noted that Hezbollah’s social and humanitarian contribution to the south Lebanese community has 
played a signifi cant role in enhancing its identity and gaining support in the state. For example, Hezbollah spent 
$300 million for its construction sector to repair damaged or destroyed homes after the 2006 war. Hezbollah 
has also contributed to all levels of Lebanon’s educational system, as well as its youth camps and religious 
programs. On primary school level, Hezbollah’s Islamic Institution for Education overseas the Mahdi schools. 
They are a network of private schools where students learn the core subjects as well as Hezbollah’s ideology. 
By 2006, approximately 14,000 students attended Hezbollah’s school. Hezbollah also created its youth wing, 
called the Mahdi Scouts. The scouts offer outdoor recreational and educational programs, as well as religious 
and ideological instruction. Some 60,000 youths participate in the Mahdi Scouts. Hezbollah has also published 
Mahdi magazine, targeting Lebanese youth, which includes cartoon depictions of deceased Hezbollah fi ghters 
and stories of suicide and other attacks against Israel.8 
Meanwhile, the economic contribution of Hezbollah to South Lebanon has had the mixed results. The southern 
part of Lebanon is relatively an economically vulnerable area with a life of poverty and misery. In particular, 
the Shiite Muslim who is the majority in the area has suffered from their poverty. There is a spark contrast 
in the housing level between the local Shiite Muslim and people from Beirut who bought expensive villas in 
South Lebanon.9 Therefore, it can be argued that many local militia employed by Hezbollah would appreciate 
their monthly income which they receive even though their income amounts to US$300-700 per month.10 
However, the economic impact of Hezbollah is far from positive on the macro level. As Hussain Abdul-Hussain 
simply put it, “Foreign investors are simply unwilling to bring their money into a country that lives in a state of 
perpetual war, with Hezbollah currently involved in regional entanglements in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, while also 
threatening to go to war with Israel.”11
3.  The Issue of the Disarmament of Hezbollah 
Thus, Hezbollah has claimed that it has had played a significant role as a protector of Lebanon on their 
domestic security, political status, and social and even economic contribution to the state. However, in terms 
of the national defense force in Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has been recognized as an offi cial 
national defense force. It has been fi nancially supported by the US, and UNIFIL has provided a peacekeeping 
training program to LAF. Above all, the continuous military crimes by Hezbollah as a terrorist group in and 
outside the state, and the serious damage infl icted on the state due to the confl ict with Israel, for example in 
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1993, 1996 and 2006, convinced the international community that Hezbollah should be disarmed. 
There are in total five international agreements and resolutions concerning the issues of Hezbollah’s 
disarmament. The first one is the Ta’if Agreement. This agreement was designed to end the civil war in 
Lebanon and reassert Lebanese authority in South Lebanon occupied by Israel. This agreement was negotiated 
in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia in September 1989, and approved by the Lebanese parliament on 4 November 1989. This 
agreement covered not only the ending of the Lebanese civil war, but also political reform in Lebanon and a 
framework for beginning of complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. This agreement transferred the power 
away from the Presidency and vested it in a cabinet equally divided between the Muslims and Christians.12 
Although the agreement provided a time frame for Syrian military withdrawal, the actual withdrawal did not 
take place until 2005.
The Ta’if Agreement also demanded the disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. However, it is 
to be noted that Hezbollah was allowed to stay armed in its capacity as a  resistance force rather than a militia 
for fi ghting Israel in South Lebanon. It means that Hezbollah was exceptionally expected to be committed to 
ending Israel’s occupation as an Islamic resistance group. The position of Hezbollah enjoyed wide support in 
Lebanon, where the Israeli occupation was seen as an impediment to the state’s recovery.13
Hezbollah continued attacks on Israel during the state’s 18-year occupation from 1982 through 2000. 
Particularly, in April 1996, there were notable confrontations between Hezbollah and Israel, called the Grapes 
of Wrath operation by the Israelis 16-day confl ict with Hezbollah. This operation was conducted in response 
to Hezbollah’s deadly attacks on Israeli soldiers in Lebanon and rockets into Israeli territory. In May 2000, 
Israel fi nally withdrew from Lebanon. In October 2001, the Middle East peace process began in Madrid. This 
development threatened to halt Hizballah’s struggle with Israel and thus cut off one of the main sources of the 
organization’s legitimacy and power.14 Then, in 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1559 was authorized. It 
was the second international agreement or resolutions concerning Hezbollah’s disarmament. Resolution 1559 
(2004) called upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon, and also called for the disbanding 
and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
On 18 April 2006, Secretary-General Kofi  Annan submitted his third semi-annual report on the implementation 
of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004). The report stated that Lebanon was still in a fragile and 
vulnerable state. This led to the adoption of the supporting resolution, UN Security Council Resolution 1680 
(2006), which was the third international agreement or resolution concerning the issues of Hezbollah’s 
disarmament. Resolution 1680 (2006) expressed regret over Lebanon’s failure to implement the disarmament of 
all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias per Resolution 1559. Therefore, Resolution 1680 reiterated the call for 
full implementation of 1559.   
In July 2006, a huge scale of 34-day military conflict took place between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, 
Northern Israel and the Golan Heights. During the war, Hezbollah fi red approximately 4,300 rockets at Israel, 
killing 39 civilians and 120 Israeli soldiers. Israel attacked both Hezbollah military targets and Lebanese 
civilian infrastructure. The war killed about 1,200 and displaced one million Lebanese people. The war led to 
the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), which was the fourth international agreement or 
resolution concerning Hezbollah’s disarmament. UNIFIL was strengthened with the advent of many European 
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troops in accordance with Resolution 1701. The Resolution  restricted Hezbollah’s presence south of the Litani 
River and asserted the authority of the Lebanese army in South Lebanon. This resolution also asserted that 
there shall be no weapons in Lebanon without the consent of the Government of Lebanon.
 
The fifth international agreement or resolution concerning Hezbollah’s disarmament was the Baabda 
Declaration in 2012. It was issued by the National Dialogue Committee on 11 June 2012. This agreement was 
virtually between the various Lebanese political groups. The agreement essentially demanded to distance 
Lebanon from the Syrian confl ict across the borders in order to avoid the negative spillover of such tensions 
into the country. In addition, the agreement enforced and respected the Ta’if Agreement and Resolution 1701.15 
Thus, one identified a number of international agreements and resolutions concerning the disarmament of 
Hezbollah. It is to be noted, however, that among them Ta’if Agreement in 1989 and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1701 in 2006, which are both the infl uential and signifi cant agreement and resolution in the peace 
process in Lebanon, have a conciliatory stance with Hezbollah. Both of them accept the deployment of 
Hezbollah forces in South Lebanon.   
In fact, as Hezbollah has been increasingly recognized as a protector of the state of Lebanon from Israel’s 
aggression, it has approval as a legitimate resistance armed group. During the war between Israel and 
Hezbollah in July 2006, President Emile Lahoud praised Hezbollah as Lebanon’s main liberator from Israel. In 
July, 2009, Michel Aoun said that Hezbollah’s weapons will no longer be a problem when the causes behind its 
existence disappear. In November, 2009, the Lebanese parliament voted to allow Hezbollah to keep its weapons. 
And in October 2016, President Michel Aoun became the fi rst Lebanese president to openly align himself with 
Hezbollah.16
Nevertheless, the UN in New York has adopted a strict approach towards Hezbollah’s developing armament. 
In April 2019, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issued a warning remark concerning the maintenance 
of Hezbollah’s sizeable military capabilities. He called on the Lebanese Government and Army to take all 
necessary measures to prevent Hezbollah from possessing arms and to work on making it a merely civil 
political party in Lebanon.17 Nevertheless, in his offi cial report to Security Council on the situation of UNIFIL 
in July 2019, Guterres accepted that the maintenance of arms by Hezbollah is outside the control of the state of 
Lebanon.18 He also said in November 2019 that Hezbollah has posed a threat to the UNIFIL mission stationed 
on the Israel-Lebanon border.19
On the whole, there are multiple legal frameworks of the disarmament of Hezbollah and the current UN 
Secretary-General has consistently called for the government to disarm it. However, in reality, its disarmament 
would be diffi cult. It is partly due to a lack of political will by the international community resulting in lack of 
the effectiveness of the resolutions and agreements on this issue. This is also partly due to the immaturity 
of the military capability of LAF and the virtual approval of the deployment of Hezbollah in South Lebanon. 
Furthermore, the strong dependency of Shiite Muslim people on Hezbollah in the security sector in South 
Lebanon is a significant factor supporting its deployment in South Lebanon. However, the current situation 




4.  Hezbollah and UNIFIL in South Lebanon
Secretary Council Resolution 1701 (2006), which authorized the redeployment of “new UNIFIL”, gave one the 
impression of it having a mandate to disarm Hezbollah. It calls for:
full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolution 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) 
, that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant t the Lebanese cabinet decision of 
July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state.20
However, in the aftermath of the passage of resolution, the UN and the contributing states to UNIFIL 
disclaimed responsibility for disarming Hezbollah.21 Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that 
“dismantling Hezbollah is not the direct mandate of the UN.” He implied that the UN could only help the 
Lebanese Government disarm Hezbollah.22 Thus, one could identify lack of enthusiasm among the UN and 
troop contributors on this issue.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah agreed to disarm its forces south of the Litani River, the area of UNIFIL’s operations, 
but not to pull its forces out of South Lebanon. Mohamad Chatah, a senior adviser to the Lebanese Prime 
Minister Siniora, said “Hezbollah individuals are people who live in the south and they will not leave homes and 
villages, but an armed Hezbollah will not be in the south.”23 In reality, Hezbollah no longer holds visible military 
positions in the area of UNIFIL. They are officially back north of the Litani River. Instead, the Hezbollah 
fi ghters in South Lebanon conduct their military operations in civilian cloaks. Mobilizing Hezbollah militias at 
UNFIL’s area of operation would be a violation of Resolution 1701 (2006) whether they were wearing military 
uniforms or civilian clothes.
In fact, Hezbollah’s armaments have not been as enthusiastically supported as previously in Lebanon after the 
Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2005 and especially after the 2006 war. Since then calls from political 
factions for Hezbollah to handover their weapons to the LAF have been increasing at national and international 
levels. However, Hezbollah has claimed that the LAF has not been regarded as a credible deterrent against 
Israel yet, and therefore that Hezbollah is the only force to win the war against the enemy state. Hezbollah 
has also been distrustful that the March 14 Movement, its political rival, would use those confi scated weapons 
against it.24
It is generally agreed that Hezbollah accepts the presence of UNIFIL as long as the latter does not interfere too 
closely with the former’s military operations. Hezbollah can give local consent to Resolution 1701 in the sense 
that it largely refrain from obstructing UNIFIL militarily.25 Nevertheless, Assaf Orion, in his paper “Hiding in 
Plain Sight: Hezbollah’s campaign Against UNIFIL”, expressed how vulnerably UNIFIL personnel have been 
treated by the locals and Hezbollah fi ghters who are ostensibly wearing civilian cloaks.
In fact, there are many cases in which UNFIL soldiers have been refused to enter the public or private 
properties while they were conducting their patrol. The local civilians refused UNIFIL soldiers’ entry because 
they claimed that the areas were religiously sensitive, or that the streets were narrow or secondary roads as 
inadequate for patrolling. They also claimed that UNIFIL should patrol only near the Blue Line while it is LAF 
who should be responsible for patrolling the villages.26
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The local villagers also disliked the photo-taking by UNIFIL staff during the patrol. Some villagers angrily 
seized UN equipment including cameras, maps, documentation and military equipment from UNIFIL staff. 
Finally, by 2019 UNIFIL accepted the demand for the prohibition of photography. It is assumed that much of 
Hezbollah’s military assets are hidden at private properties in South Lebanon. General Gadi Eisenkot, the then 
Israeli army Chief of Staff revealed in 2017 that Hezbollah has a military presence in 240 villages in southern 
Lebanon, including forces and weapons in “almost every third or fourth house” inside civilian population 
centres.27 Consequently, it became more diffi cult for UNIFIL to collect information and evidence on violations.28 
Orion concluded as follows: 
The underlying message is clear: UNIFIL’s presence is tolerated as long as it adheres to the “southern Lebanon 
rules” dictated by Hezbollah. … Each aggressive incident establishes the power relations between UNIFIL and 
locals as well as the dictated rules of the games: Keep to the trail, keep your eyes shut, keep your reports mild and 
reassuring – or else.29
Furthermore, the LAF has not been so cooperative with UNIFIL although both of them have been conducting 
joint training in order to enhance the former’s capability as peacekeepers in South Lebanon. Ran Porat in 
his paper “How Hezbollah neutralized UNIFIL” pointed out that LAF, in fact, betrayed UNIFIL in conducting 
their duty of patrolling. LAF soldiers stood by and even assisted Hezbollah by blocking UNIFIL patrols or by 
mutual coordination of activities along the border. Occasionally, information provided from UNIFIL to LAF 
was afterwards shared with Hezbollah.30 Porat also argued that expecting the LAF to disarm Hezbollah, in 
accordance with Resolution 1701 is unrealistic. LAF could not confront the Shi’ite-led Hezbollah because of the 
latter’s politically infl uential power 31
Since most of the villagers in South Lebanon are Hezbollah’s enthusiastic supporters, some of them have been 
reluctant to join the development projects sponsored by UNIFIL. It is because by not participating in UNIFIL’s 
aid projects, locals reject UNIFIL’s objective to disarm Hezbollah and delegitimize it as a resistance party. In this 
context, Susann Kassen in her paper “Peacekeeping, Development, and Counterinsurgency” described that the 
southern Lebanese villagers marginalized the so-called ‘Quick Impact Projects’ (QIPs) sponsored by UNIFIL. 
UNIFIL’s QIPs are small-scale and short-term development projects carried out with local municipalities. 
However, Kassen argued that QIPs are political activities with the Western-designed vision of peace in South 
Lebanon.32 Her argument is based on the analysis that in QIPs UNIFIL is enthusiastic to do these projects with 
non-governmental, “grassroots” organization, as well as individuals who are not politically affi liated with Amal 
or Hezbollah. Therefore, it is considered that QIPs are highly related to UNIFIL’s disarmament plans. QIPs are 
directly linked to military aims, and to the security concerns of the troop-contributing countries of UNIFIL such 
as France, Spain, and Italy.33 
Consequently, according to deputy mayor in the village of Kheir, the municipality sends only specifi c people 
to UNIFIL events of QIPs to keep UNIFIL from building its preferable relations with their villagers. There is a 
very apparent sense of indifference among villagers about being involved in QIPs.34 Kassen also argued that the 
villagers feel threatened as UNIFIL deliberately avoids addressing the history of this region and takes a pro-




On the whole, the villagers put a more supportive and dependent stance on Hezbollah than on UNIFIL. 
Consequently, the development programs sponsored by UNFIL, which would be regarded as competing as 
ones by Hezbollah, have been marginalized and even segregated by local villagers.
5.  Are There Any Solutions? : as a concluding remark
Hezbollah, which originated as a revolutionary resistance group, has also been deeply rooted in the south 
Lebanese society, contributing to the security, and social and economic development. The group now occupies 
a signifi cant number of parliamentary and cabinet positions in the Lebanese politics. However, its status as a 
terrorist group has been consistent, threatening the international security. As long as Hezbollah is deployed in 
South Lebanon, Israel would continue challenging Hezbollah’s military intimidation and threat, which might 
result in another major warfare between them. This article demonstrated that several international agreements 
and UN resolutions on the disarmament of Hezbollah were not so effective and promising. To make the matter 
worth, Hezbollah became a so-called “nuisance” for UNIFIL. Hezbollah took advantage of the cozy relations 
and even conspired with the local villagers, who helped conceal Hezbollah’s sizeable and sophisticated military 
equipment and prevented UNFIL from entering their personal properties. Such behavior obviously reduces the 
operational effectiveness of UNIFIL and increase the risk of further confl ict with Israel.
Are there any solutions to this problem: how can the infl uence of Hezbollah be mitigated in South Lebanon 
so that UNIFIL would play a better role? There would be no clear solution and panacea to tackle this issue. 
However, the following four scenarios can be suggested.
First, LAF should be better equipped and trained so that it can strengthen the military capability so that it will 
be able to replace Hezbollah. Therefore, the international community including the UN and the great powers 
such as the US should pay more attention to it. The US claimed that there seemed be no distinction between 
LAF and Hezbollah in the real operational ground, threatening to cut the fi nancial aid to LAF. Therefore, the 
Lebanese Government should draw a clear line on Hezbollah between its legitimate political entity and the 
illegitimate resistance and terrorist group, so that the great powers would continue supporting LAF fi nancially 
and militarily. The government should also strongly demand LAF not to cooperate with Hezbollah.
Second, UNFIL should continue deploying in South Lebanon with its current robust capability. Since 2006 
in the aftermath of the war, UNIFIL has been redeployed with a more sizeable strength of more than10,000 
troops. New UNIFIL includes thousands of troops from European contributing states with more sophisticated 
equipment and special force units such as the maritime force. New UNIFIL has surely played a more signifi cant 
role as a deterrent than previously in South Lebanon, mitigating the potential of the outbreak of major confl ict 
between Israel and Hezbollah. If Hezbollah has less opportunity to launch offensive operations against Israel, 
Iran’s fi nancial support to Hezbollah would be decreased. It would weaken Hezbollah’s whole capability.
Third, the international community and especially the Lebanese government should pay more attention to the 
situation of economic poverty and social vulnerability surrounding the Shi’ite community in South Lebanon. 
Their vulnerable situation has meant that they have depended on Hezbollah’s aid and development programs 
and even have been recruited as Hezbollah forces. In fact, there is a huge gap in quality of life between 
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the people in the northern and southern areas in Lebanon. Therefore, more public investment should be 
encouraged to be provided to South Lebanon by the government. As a result, new employment would be 
created in which Hezbollah fighters would be able to find peaceful jobs. It would function as disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR).
Fourth, the international community should encourage Israel and Lebanon to enhance their diplomatic 
relations. On this matter, it should be noted that at the time of writing Israel has reached diplomatic agreements 
with several Arab states such as UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan, with the mediation of the US. It is a good sign for 
relations between Israel and Lebanon. If they reach a diplomatic agreement, Hezbollah will get lose legitimacy 
and become weaker.   
Among the above four scenarios, the fi rst and second ones, which have a micro view, can be put into practice 
relatively in a short term, while the third and fourth ones, which have rather  a macro view, need the wide 
support from the international community with longer visions. Ideally, all of them should be considered with a 
good balance by all of the stakeholders and the international community.
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